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HOW INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX POLICY 
AFFECTS ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
David Clingingsmith* & Scott Shane** 
 
This Article reviews the empirical literature on the effects of individual 
income tax policy on entrepreneurship.  We find no evidence of consensus, 
even on relatively narrow questions such as whether individual income tax 
rates deter or encourage entrepreneurial entry.  We believe the absence of 
consensus reflects both the complexity of mechanisms connecting tax policy 
to entrepreneurial decision making and the infeasibility of employing the 
most reliable empirical methods, such as experiments, in this domain. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Introductory economics students are often taught the rule of thumb that if 
policymakers want less of something, they should tax it.  Taxes, according 
to standard microeconomic theory, reduce the incentive for people to 
engage in the activity that is taxed. 
Many policymakers around the globe believe that this rule of thumb is 
true for the effect of individual income tax rates on entrepreneurship.1  
However, both theoretical reasoning and a careful examination of the 
empirical evidence present a more complex picture of the relationship 
between individual income taxes and entrepreneurial activity.  The simple 
rule of thumb that higher tax rates mean less entrepreneurial activity is not 
as accurate as many people believe. 
This Article summarizes what the economic and public policy literatures 
have discovered about the different ways that individual income tax policy 
affects entrepreneurial activity.  While policy discussions cover many 
dimensions of tax policy and numerous aspects of entrepreneurship, 
scholarly research on the topic has explored the effects of relatively few 
aspects of individual income tax policy on a limited set of dimensions of 
entrepreneurship.  This Article reviews topics on which at least one 
academic researcher has conducted an empirical investigation. 
The dimensions of entrepreneurial activity covered in this Article are:  
(1)  the decision to enter entrepreneurship, (2)  the decision to exit 
entrepreneurship, (3)  the selection of the legal form of business, (4)  
compliance with tax laws, (5)  employment of workers, (6)  company sales, 
and (7)  the tendency of business owners to make capital investments. 
I.  SUMMARY ASSESSMENT 
Policymakers may hope to find guidance from the body of literature 
about the likely effects on entrepreneurship of individual income tax 
policies.  However, the existing evidence does not provide a clear or 
consistent story about how taxes affect entrepreneurship.  This summary 
outlines the reasons for this assessment.  There are a number of 
methodological issues that make application of the findings in the literature 
quite challenging.  We review these issues first.  We then discuss the 
findings themselves, which are varied enough as to be inconclusive. 
A.  Measurement of Entrepreneurship 
Policymakers generally assume that researchers are referring to a 
particular conceptual definition of entrepreneurship when looking at the 
empirical evidence that researchers have produced on the effect of 
 
 1. See, e.g., Press Release, House Small Bus. Comm., Chabot Talks Empowering 
America’s Entrepreneurs at National Press Club (Feb. 22, 2016), 
http://smallbusiness.house.gov/news/documentquery.aspx?IssueID=5407 [https://perma.cc/ 
XU3Q-7Z8X]; Press Release, House Small Bus. Comm., Graves:  Small Business Tax 
Increases Add to Economic Uncertainty (May 5, 2010), http://smallbusiness.house.gov/ 
news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=184331 [https://perma.cc/8ABV-4DQ4]. 
2016] INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP 2497 
individual income taxes on entrepreneurial activity.2  While not always the 
case, most policymakers implicitly think entrepreneurship means innovative 
and productive business activities that provide employment to others.  
Empirically, however, such innovative and productive entrepreneurship is 
difficult to measure.  As a result, the operational definition of 
entrepreneurship in the empirical papers is much broader than the 
innovative, productive, and employment-generating entrepreneurship that 
policymakers seek to understand. 
For the most part, scholarly literature has focused on much broader 
measures of entrepreneurship, such as the number of people who report they 
are self-employed or the number of people who file a Schedule C to report 
business profits and losses with their individual income tax return.  While 
some innovative entities that contribute to employment and productivity 
belong to this group, the majority of these entities are self-employed 
independent contractors in retail trade, personal services, or construction.3  
The average person reporting profit from a sole proprietorship by filing a 
Schedule C earned only $12,900 in profit on $55,200 in revenue in 2012.4  
We believe that many of the people included in such measures are those 
selling goods on eBay or renting their possessions to others through the 
sharing economy, not creating businesses in the sense that most 
policymakers envision. 
Moreover, sole proprietors and people with Schedule C income are 
largely nonemployers.  In 2011, 80 percent of the 28.2 million small 
businesses in the United States had no employees.5  Census Bureau data 
reveal that nonemployers account for only about 4 percent of the gross 
receipts of all small businesses.6 
This means that when a study shows that a particular tax policy has an 
effect on the sole proprietors’ share of employment or the fraction of 
taxpayers with Schedule C income, it is likely that the effect is entirely 
driven by nonemployer small businesses, which have little economic impact 
and contribute little to employment.  Indeed, because only a small fraction 
of the sole proprietors and Schedule C filers are engaged in high-value 
entrepreneurship, their response to a given policy makes a relatively small 
contribution to the average effects measured in the literature.  In fact, it is 
possible that an individual income tax policy that positively affects overall 
self-employment or Schedule C tax filings might reduce the formation of 
 
 2. See HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON ENTREPRENEURSHIP POLICY 143 (David B. 
Audretsch, Isabel Grilo & A. Roy Thuri eds., 2007). 
 3. Steven F. Hipple, Self-Employment in the United States, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Sept. 
2010, at 17, 25. 
 4. Adrian Dungan, Sole Proprietorship Returns, 2012, STAT. INCOME BULL., Winter 
2015, at 1, 2. 
 5. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 1 (2014), https://www. 
sba.gov/sites/default/files/FAQ_March_2014_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/W6XF-XWF9]. 
 6. See Statistics for All U.S. Firms That Were Jointly Owned and Operated by Spouses 
by Industry, Gender, Ethnicity, Race, and Veteran Status for the U.S.:  2012, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, http://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid= 
SBO_2012_00CSCB01&prodType=table (last visited Apr. 29, 2016) [https://perma.cc/ 
8DWQ-DJ8K]. 
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high-growth startups, or vice versa.  For example, policies that encourage 
self-employed independent contractors might make it more difficult for 
people to hire the employees they need to work in innovative, productive 
employer businesses. 
As a result, the empirical evidence of the effects of individual income tax 
policy on entrepreneurial activity tells us little about the effect of taxes on 
innovative, productive, employment-generating entrepreneurial activity.  
The effects measured in the studies are dominated by the behavior of 
entities—self-employed independent contractors without employees who 
produce a small amount of sales—that policymakers are not seeking to 
influence. 
Besides being too broad to capture the type of entrepreneurship of most 
interest to policymakers, a further issue with the use of taxpayers who file a 
Schedule C as a measure of entrepreneurial activity is that many people 
(e.g., taxi drivers, therapists, carpenters, and so on) can organize their labor 
as paid employees or as contractors.  Changes in the share of taxpayers 
filing a Schedule C might capture changes in ways of organizing existing 
economic activity in response to tax rules rather than in response to the 
formation of new businesses.  For instance, the total number of people 
driving taxis for a living might not be affected by tax laws, but those rules 
could change dramatically the fraction who file a Schedule C. 
Moreover, higher levels of Schedule C tax filings or sole proprietorships 
may not achieve goals of higher employment or increased productivity, 
because it is unclear the extent to which these filers hire others or improve 
productivity.  The majority of Schedule C filers and sole proprietors have 
no employees and are found in the lower-growth sectors of retail sales, 
personal services, and construction. 
Some people become self-employed to reduce their tax liabilities, rather 
than to build businesses.  To the extent that tax avoiders are simply 
reorganizing their existing activities for this purpose, their choice to be self-
employed is unlikely to boost economic output.  An example of self-
employment as tax avoidance can be seen in data on the Earned Income Tax 
Credit.  As Emmanuel Saez has found, many tax filers report the exact 
amount of self-employment income that will maximize their tax refund 
under the Earned Income Tax Credit.7 
B.  True Effects and Spurious Correlations 
Leaving the question of how entrepreneurial activity is measured, the 
effects reported in many of the empirical studies we reviewed could be 
spurious.  Virtually all empirical analysis of tax policy relies on variation in 
the policy to estimate its effects, because experimental designs that 
randomly assign tax policies are not possible.  This means that the statistical 
problems of endogeneity and omitted variable bias make most of the 
 
 7. Emmanuel Saez, Do Taxpayers Bunch at Kink Points?, 2 AM. ECON. J. ECON. POL’Y 
180 (2010). 
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findings from studies of the effects of tax policy artifacts and not robust 
results. 
Consider the simple example of a tax rate that is 6 percent in the state of 
Ohio in 2010, and suppose that 10 percent of Ohioans are self-employed in 
that year.  To say something about how this tax rate and self-employment 
are related, we need to make a comparison either across time or geography 
to a different tax rate.  Perhaps the rate is 3 percent in Indiana in 2010, or 
perhaps it was 5 percent in Ohio in 2011.  If either of these are the case, we 
have the basis to make a comparison.  For example, if the tax rate in Ohio 
fell 1 percentage point between 2010 and 2011, and the rate of self-
employment rose to 12 percent, we could argue that a 1 percentage point 
change in the tax rate is associated with a 2 percentage point change in self-
employment. 
However, if the tax rate never changes, we cannot say anything, even if 
there is a change in self-employment.  This is because there are other 
factors that influence self-employment, such as demand for goods.  
Variation in rates is needed in both this simple example and the regression 
analyses that are the main statistical tool in the literature. 
Despite the necessity of employing such variation, its use poses a major 
challenge.  Variation in tax rates does not happen randomly, but instead 
results from a political process that is sensitive to changes in economic 
conditions and to lobbying.  This means that any correlation between tax 
rates and entrepreneurial activity could be a spurious reflection of changes 
in economic or political conditions rather than the effect of tax rates.  
Indeed, a recent study of seventy-three major federal tax changes since 
1945 found that economic conditions were an important motivation for the 
change in about 40 percent of cases.8 
The studies we reviewed for this Article vary in the degree to which 
concerns about spurious correlation were addressed methodologically.  
However, none are entirely immune from this criticism.  That criticism is a 
problem for policymakers seeking to use these results to formulate tax 
policy. 
If we are to expect a newly designed tax policy to have the same effect 
on entrepreneurship when enacted as has been previously measured in the 
literature, we must be confident that the literature has uncovered a causal 
relationship and not simply a correlation.  By and large, the literature on 
entrepreneurship and tax policy employs methods that do not warrant this 
degree of confidence.  For example, many studies of tax rates look at how 
rates vary over time or across jurisdictions (e.g., states or countries) to draw 
conclusions about effects of those rates on entrepreneurial activity.9  
 
 8. Christina D. Romer & David H. Romer, The Macroeconomic Effects of Tax 
Changes:  Estimates Based on a New Measure of Fiscal Shocks, 100 AM. ECON. REV. 763, 
781–84 (2010) (authors’ computations based on dataset available at https://www.aeaweb.org/ 
aer/data/june2010/20080421_data.zip). 
 9. See, e.g., DONALD BRUCE & TAMI GURLEY, SBA OFFICE OF ADVOCACY, TAXES AND 
ENTREPRENEURIAL ENTRY:  AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION USING LONGITUDINAL TAX 
RETURN DATA (2005); WILLIAM GALE & SAMUEL BROWN, TAX POLICY CTR., SMALL 
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However, we know the entrepreneurial environment differs across states 
and countries in many other ways besides tax rates, not all of which can be 
controlled for in a statistical analysis. 
The reader may wonder whether our caution about drawing conclusions 
from the literature on taxation and entrepreneurship reflects a more general 
skepticism about the value of empirical evidence for policy.  It does not.  
There are methods of empirical research that can provide quite reliable 
evidence to policymakers, but the feasibility of those methods varies 
depending on the policy question concerned. 
The most reliable method is a randomized experiment, in which different 
policy options are randomly assigned to subsets of the population targeted 
by the policy and the effects compared.10  This method has been very 
successful in developing evidence in policy areas such as K–12 education.11  
We do not see such experiments with tax rates because they are infeasible.  
This means it is more difficult to produce high quality evidence about the 
effects of tax rates than education policy. 
Less reliable than a true randomized experiment is a so-called “natural” 
experiment, in which different groups face different policies for reasons 
unrelated to the outcomes of interest.  In the case of tax policy and 
entrepreneurship, such evidence could be provided by a change in tax rates 
that happens for reasons unrelated to the economic and political conditions 
that influence the decision to start a new business.  Unfortunately, the 
literature on individual income tax policy and entrepreneurial activity does 
not include studies that employ natural experiment methods explicitly, and 
only a few studies, such as those that use changes in tax rates from the Tax 
Reform Act of 1986,12 are even close to this method. 
The most commonly used method in producing empirical evidence for 
policy, both overall and in the case of taxation in particular, is multivariate 
regression analysis of time series or panel data.  These studies make the 
underlying assumption that, by including some controls for economic 
conditions, such as the overall level of output, the studies observe a 
variation in tax policy unrelated to all other factors that influence 
entrepreneurial decision making.13  If that assumption is incorrect, then the 
effects the studies report are biased.  Unfortunately, there is no way to test 
the validity of the assumption, leaving open the possibility that the effect on 
 
BUSINESS, INNOVATION, AND TAX POLICY:  A REVIEW (2013); Julie Berry Cullen & Roger H. 
Gordon, Taxes and Entrepreneurial Risk-Taking:  Theory and Evidence for the U.S., 91 J. 
PUB. ECON. 1479 (2007); Norbert J. Michel & Ralph A. Rector, A Research Program on the 
Interplay Between Entrepreneurial Activity and Tax Policy, HERITAGE FOUND. (Nov. 24, 
2004), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2004/11/a-research-program-on-the-inter 
play-between-entrepreneurial-activity-and-tax-policy [https://perma.cc/K7LY-H3N8]. 
 10. See Jens Ludwig, Jeffrey R. Kling & Sendhil Mullainathan, Mechanism Experiments 
and Policy Evaluations, 25 J. ECON. PERSP. 17, 22 (2011). 
 11. See, e.g., Sally Sadoff, The Role of Experimentation in Education Policy, 30 
OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 597 (2014). 
 12. 26 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). 
 13. See, e.g., GALE & BROWN, supra note 9, at 23–26; Michel & Rector, supra note 9. 
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entrepreneurial activity reported in the study is not the true effect of the tax 
policy. 
C.  Theoretical Predictions and Inconclusive Findings 
Leaving aside difficulties in measurement and in distinguishing causal 
effects from spurious correlations, individual income tax policy has 
countervailing theoretical effects on entrepreneurship.  As a result, it is not 
clear that we should see an effect of tax rates on entrepreneurial activity in 
empirical studies. 
Consider the following countervailing effects.  Business owners and the 
self-employed can more easily evade taxes than wage earners because 
wages are reported to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), but profits from 
business activity are not.  The greater ease that business owners and the 
self-employed have in evading taxes implies that higher income tax rates 
should increase the rates of business entry and self-employment.  After all, 
the benefit of evading taxes rises with the rate that one would have paid had 
one not evaded taxes. 
On the other hand, starting a business involves taking the risk that it may 
fail.  Because business profits are taxed more heavily than losses are 
credited, both in the United States and in several other countries, an 
increase in the marginal tax rate increases the risk borne by the owner.  All 
other things being equal, this increase in risk should reduce the rate of entry 
into entrepreneurship. 
The measured relationship between tax rates and entrepreneurial entry in 
the literature is the net effect of these two countervailing forces.  
Empirically, the literature shows that neither effect dominates.  The net 
effect of a marginal tax rate increase is positive in some studies and 
negative in others.  It is generally small.  Studies that find a positive effect 
tend to emphasize the tax-avoidance explanation,14 while those that find a 
negative effect tend to emphasize the risk-taking explanation.15  A small 
subset of studies attempts to explore the countervailing effects more 
directly and generally finds net positive effects for some subgroups of 
entrepreneurs and net negative effects for others.16  Many of the papers use 
 
 14. See Donald J. Bruce, John Deskins & Mohammed Mohsin, State Tax Policies and 
Entrepreneurial Activity:  A Panel Data Analysis, 96 NAT’L TAX ASS’N PROC. 325 (2003); 
Cullen & Gordon, supra note 9; Simon C. Parker & Martin T. Robson, Explaining 
International Variations in Self-Employment:  Evidence from a Panel of OECD Countries, 
71 S. ECON. J. 287 (2004). 
 15. See BRUCE & GURLEY, supra note 9; Donald Bruce & John Deskins, Can State Tax 
Policies Be Used to Promote Entrepreneurial Activity?, 38 SMALL BUS. ECON. 375 (2012); 
Donald Bruce & Mohammed Mohsin, Tax Policy and Entrepreneurship:  New Time Series 
Evidence, 26 SMALL BUS. ECON. 409 (2006). 
 16. See David M. Blau, A Time-Series Analysis of Self-Employment in the United States, 
95 J. POL. ECON. 445 (1987); Yannis Georgellis & Howard J. Wall, Entrepreneurship and 
the Policy Environment, 88 FED. RES. BANK ST. LOUIS REV. 95 (2006); see also Andrea 
Asoni & Tino Sanandaji, Taxation and the Quality of Entrepreneurship, 113 J. ECON. 101 
(2014); William M. Gentry & R. Glenn Hubbard, Tax Policy and Entrepreneurial Entry, 90 
AM. ECON. REV. 283 (2000). 
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data from countries besides the United States.17  Given the complexity of 
the policy environments facing businesses, it is not clear how much we can 
use such evidence to predict what would happen in the United States. 
Taxes also differently affect different entrepreneurial outcomes, such as 
entry, investment, employment, and exit.  For example, a lower marginal 
income tax rate might spur entrepreneurial investment but deter business 
owners from employing others.  The effect of the marginal tax rate on 
hiring others and making capital investments could be positive or negative 
depending on whether labor or capital is a complement or substitute for the 
entrepreneur’s effort.  Because we do not know which entrepreneurial 
outcome is most important to society (investment versus employment, for 
example), it is difficult to make use of these findings for policy purposes. 
D.  Alternative Use of Resources 
We also need to remember that policymakers care about more than just 
entrepreneurship.  Even if there were to be definitive evidence that a 
particular tax reduced a valued aspect of entrepreneurial activity by some 
amount, that fact would need to be weighed against the value of the 
activities that the revenue raised by such a tax would fund.  For example, an 
income tax surcharge might reduce the rate at which people engage in 
entrepreneurial activity, but make possible investment in early childhood 
education.  Early childhood education might enhance productivity by more 
than the tax on entrepreneurial activity reduced it.  If that were the case, 
then the income tax surcharge might have a clear negative effect on 
entrepreneurial activity but be socially desirable. 
E.  Summary Conclusion 
The most we can say about tax policy and entrepreneurial activity is that 
the effects on broad measures of entrepreneurship of marginal changes to 
the individual income tax seem likely to be small.  And this is before adding 
our concerns about measurement and causality to the mix. 
II.  EVIDENCE ON THE EFFECT OF INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAXES 
Much research has explored the effect of average and marginal income 
tax rates on a variety of different dimensions of entrepreneurial activity, 
from entry to exit to sales and employment growth.  Far from showing the 
straightforward effect assumed to hold in many policy discussions, the 
research shows a complex relationship between income tax rates and 
entrepreneurship. 
 
 17. See, e.g., Asoni & Sanandaji, supra note 16; Simon C. Parker, Does Tax Evasion 
Affect Occupational Choice?, 65 OXFORD BULL. ECON. & STAT. 379 (2003); Parker & 
Robson, supra note 14; Herb J. Schuetze, Taxes, Economic Conditions and Recent Trends in 
Male Self-Employment:  A Canada-US Comparison, 7 LAB. ECON. 507 (2000). 
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A.  Entry 
A wide variety of studies in the United States and other countries has 
explored the relationship between income tax rates and numerous measures 
of entrepreneurial entry using data from a wide variety of sources.  Norbert 
Michel and Ralph Rector,18 as well as William Gale and Samuel Brown,19 
provide useful reviews of this literature. 
Theoretically, tax rates should have countervailing effects on 
entrepreneurial entry.  On the one hand, higher marginal and average tax 
rates provide an incentive to start companies, because business owners can 
more easily engage in tax evasion than wageworkers.20  The gap between 
tax rates on self- and wage-employment income should provide a similar 
incentive.  If taxes are higher on wage employment than on self-
employment, people should prefer to engage in self-employment, boosting 
entrepreneurial entry. 
On the other hand, taxes discourage people from engaging in risky 
activity.  When a tax code taxes profits more heavily than it provides tax 
credits for losses of corresponding size, which is the case in the United 
States, policymakers create an incentive for people to engage in activity that 
generates income with less variability.  This incentive increases with the 
size of the marginal tax rate.  When marginal tax rates are high, but tax 
credits for losses are low, the share of profits that people get to keep is 
lower than when marginal tax rates are low and tax credits are high.  But 
under these circumstances, the size of the credits they receive to defray their 
losses are small.  This creates a disincentive to engage in risky activity like 
business formation, discouraging entrepreneurial entry. 
As one might expect from these countervailing effects, the empirical 
research provides conflicting results on the net effect of tax rates.  And 
authors tend to focus on the explanation that is consistent with their beliefs 
or their empirical results.  Studies that find negative effects tend to 
emphasize the asymmetric taxation of profits and losses as an explanation 
for the effects of taxation,21 while those that find positive effects tend to 
emphasize the tax-avoidance story.22 
B.  Evidence for Negative Effects on Entry 
One set of papers seeks to find support for the microeconomic theory 
argument that marginal tax rates have a negative effect on the willingness of 
people to enter into entrepreneurship, because taxes reduce the returns that 
people get from engaging in this risky activity. 
 
 18. Michel & Rector, supra note 9. 
 19. GALE & BROWN, supra note 9, at 23–26. 
 20. Cullen & Gordon, supra note 9, at 1486. 
 21. See GALE & BROWN, supra note 9; Bruce & Mohsin, supra note 15; Michel & 
Rector, supra note 9. 
 22. See DONALD B. MARRON, TAX ISSUES FACING SMALL BUSINESS (2014); Cullen & 
Gordon, supra note 9; James E. Long, The Income Tax and Self-Employment, 35 NAT’L TAX 
J. 31 (1982). 
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Donald Bruce and Tami Gurley empirically explored how marginal 
income taxes affect entrepreneurial entry—defined as presence of Schedule 
C income on individual tax returns—from 1979 to 1990.23  For single filers, 
the authors found that a 1 percentage point increase in the marginal self-
employed income tax rate decreases the probability of entry by 1.42 
percentage points.24  For married filers, the authors found that a 1 
percentage point increase in the marginal self-employed income tax rate 
decreases the probability of entry by 2 percentage points.25  They also 
found positive effects of the wage and salary tax rate on entrepreneurial 
entry that were smaller in magnitude.26 
Research by Donald Bruce and John Deskins also provides support for 
the proposition that tax rates have a negative effect on entrepreneurial entry, 
although the magnitude of the effects they find is small.27  The authors 
measure the variation in entrepreneurial activity across U.S. states by the 
number of individual federal income tax returns with Schedule C income as 
a share of total federal income tax returns and as the share of nonfarm sole 
proprietors in the workforce for each state from 1989 to 2002.28  They 
found that increasing top marginal personal income tax rates by 1 
percentage point decreases the state’s share of entrepreneurs by 0.016 
percentage points.29 
The effect of lower tax rates on the tendency to be an entrepreneur may 
stem from the difference between taxes on wage and entrepreneurial 
income.  When there is more of a tax advantage to being self-employed 
relative to being wage employed, then more people shift to self-
employment at the margin as a way to organize their economic activity.  
Supporting evidence for this proposition can be found in Bruce’s analysis of 
2638 self-employed male household heads aged twenty-five to fifty-four in 
the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) from 1970 to 1991.30  Bruce 
found that increasing the average tax rate differential between wage-and-
salary tax rates and self-employed income tax rates (wage-and-salary tax 
rate minus self-employed tax rate) by 5 percentage points increases the 
 
 23. BRUCE & GURLEY, supra note 9, at 338. 
 24. Id. at 340–41. 
 25. Id.  These relatively large effects result from instrumental variables estimates in 
which the instrument for the tax rate at time t is an estimated tax rate using time t income 
and time t-1 tax rules.  Because tax rules may themselves be endogenous and because time t 
income surely is, it is unlikely that this instrument is valid.  An invalid instrument can lead to 
large biases in the estimates. JOSHUA D. ANGRIST & JÖRN-STEFFEN PISCHKE, MOSTLY 
HARMLESS ECONOMETRICS:  AN EMPIRICIST’S COMPANION 116–17, 153–54 (2008).  
Consistent with this observation, the ordinary least squares estimates are much smaller than 
the instrumental variables estimates, though still negative. 
 26. See BRUCE & GURLEY, supra note 9, at 341. 
 27. Bruce & Deskins, supra note 15, at 392. 
 28. Id. at 394. 
 29. Id. at 388. 
 30. Donald Bruce, Effects of the United States Tax System on Transitions into Self-
Employment, 7 LAB. ECON. 545, 554 (2000). 
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probability of entry by 0.4 percentage points, compared to an average entry 
rate of 3.3 percent.31 
While all of these studies are suggestive of the idea that higher marginal 
tax rates deter entrepreneurial entry, interpretation of their results is 
complicated by the fact that some tax rate changes are direct responses to 
economic conditions, meaning that the estimates suffer from endogeneity 
bias.  This means that the negative correlation between the higher marginal 
tax rate and entrepreneurial activity may not actually represent the effect of 
the tax rate on entrepreneurial activity, but some other factor affecting the 
correlation.  As was mentioned earlier, Christina Romer and David Romer 
find such biases to be substantial in studies of the effects of tax policy on 
economic activity in general.32  Such biases complicate efforts by 
policymakers to draw normative conclusions about the effect of tax policy 
on entrepreneurial entry.33 
In addition, these studies suffer from small effect sizes.  Marginal tax 
rates may influence entrepreneurial entry, but to generate a nontrivial effect 
on entrepreneurial activity, policymakers would need to undertake very 
large changes to marginal income tax rates.  Further, some of the measures 
in the studies represent a type of entrepreneurial activity that policymakers 
may not be concerned with boosting.  To the extent that high marginal 
income tax rates deter entry into Schedule C tax filings or self-employment, 
when such activity represents the petty entrepreneurial activity of 
nonemployers who generate very little economic impact, policymakers may 
not care to encourage it. 
Several studies conducted in other countries also support the proposition 
that higher tax rates lower entrepreneurial activity.  K. Peren Arin et al. 
used cross-country data on total early-stage entrepreneurial activity 
(TEA)—defined as the percentage of the adult population (ages eighteen to 
sixty-four) either actively involved in starting a new venture or an 
owner/manager of a business less than forty-two months old—from the 
Global Entrepreneurship Monitor from 1999 to 2005.34  The authors found 
that individual marginal tax rates negatively correlate with TEA.35  That is, 
places with higher marginal income tax rates have less entrepreneurial 
activity. 
Similarly, Ruud A. de Mooij and Gaëtan Nicodème examine Eurostat 
data on the birth rate of new companies in twenty European countries 
between 1998 and 2003.36  They find that the personal income tax rates 
exert a negative impact on firm birth rates.37 
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Åsa Hansson also finds that both marginal and average tax rates have a 
negative impact on self-employment.38  Using data compiled by the 
Longitudinal Individual Database (LINDA), which gathers tax information 
from 75,000 Swedish citizens from 1985 to 2000, she shows that a 1 
percent increase in the average tax rate leads to a 0.04 percent reduction to 
the probability of being self-employed.39 
Ergete Ferede presents findings that support a negative relationship when 
analyzing Canadian data.40  Examining the effects of personal income tax 
progressivity on self-employment in ten Canadian provinces from 1979 to 
2006, he finds that as tax progressivity increases, the self-employment rate 
(measured four different ways) decreases.41  The coefficient estimate in his 
analysis implies that a 1 percent increase in the marginal income tax rate 
leads to a 0.19 percent decrease in the rate of self-employment.42 
While all of these studies find results consistent with each other and with 
those conducted in the United States, they do not provide much guidance 
for policymakers.  The magnitude of these negative effects of marginal tax 
rates on measures of entrepreneurial activity in most of the non-U.S. studies 
is rather small.  If these results are to be believed, policymakers would have 
to undertake massive changes in tax rates to generate small changes in 
entrepreneurial entry. 
Moreover, not all studies find that these effects are present for all new 
and small businesses.  In particular, at least one study finds that the negative 
effect of marginal income tax rates on entrepreneurial activity exists only 
for larger new ventures.  Andrea Asoni and Tino Sanandaji explored 
taxation effects on both the quantity and quality of entrepreneurship.43  
Using data from the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor from thirty-eight 
countries over eight years (2000 to 2006 and 2012), the authors found that a 
country’s total tax rate correlates negatively with the number of established 
owner-managed firms with at least twenty employees.44  Further, they 
found the total tax rate correlates positively with the number of owner-
managed firms with fewer than twenty employees.45 
C.  Evidence of Positive Effects on Entry 
Perhaps most problematic for any efforts to draw normative conclusions 
about the negative effect of marginal income tax rates on entrepreneurial 
entry is a set of studies that shows the opposite effect.  Several studies have 
found that higher marginal income tax rates boost entrepreneurial entry.  As 
described above, increasing the marginal personal income tax rate can, in 
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theory, increase entrepreneurial activity because people enter into self-
employment as a way to evade taxes.  Donald Marron explains that small 
businesses can more easily underpay their taxes than wage workers because 
they often deal in cash and engage in transactions that are not reported to 
the IRS.46  Susan Nelson reports that nonfarm proprietors contributed $68 
billion of the $197 billion in the tax-underreporting gap identified by the 
U.S. tax authorities in 2001 and that sole proprietors had the highest rate of 
misreporting at 57 percent.47 
The incentive to underreport taxes rises with the tax rate.  Because self-
employment provides both greater opportunities to underreport income and 
to take advantage of expense deductions, as personal income tax rates rise, 
people who can organize their economic activity as either wage or self-
employment have an incentive to organize it as self-employment.  As a 
result, there should be a positive association between self-employment and 
the personal income tax rate.  Several studies show support for this 
proposition.  For instance, James Long empirically explored how income 
tax rate differentials between self-employed and wage and salary workers 
affect the probability of self-employment entry using data on 28,893 
nonagriculture-employed men ages twenty-five to sixty-four who had 
positive earnings in 1969, based on the 1970 Census of Population.48  He 
found that increased income tax rates increase the probability of self-
employment entry.  He found that a 10 percent increase in expected income 
taxes increases the probability of entering self-employment by 7.4 percent. 
Other authors found even larger magnitudes of this effect.  Using U.S. 
Statistics of Income tax return data, Julie Berry Cullen and Roger H. 
Gordon examined two million single Schedule C filers with business losses 
greater than 10 percent of reported wage income between 1964 and 1993.49  
They looked at taxpayers with losses to try to identify those Schedule C 
filers who were undertaking risky ventures.  They found that uniformly 
reducing the marginal personal income tax rate by 5 percentage points 
would decrease entrepreneurial activity by 30 percent.50 
These patterns also have been observed using state-level variation.  Bruce 
et al. measured the effect of the top personal income tax rate on the share of 
individual federal income tax returns with Schedule C income and the share 
of sole proprietors in the workforce for each state from 1989 to 2000.51  The 
authors found that a 1 percentage point increase in top marginal personal 
income tax rate on wage income increases the number of sole proprietors by 
0.07 percentage points, a small but positive correlation.52 
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Donald Bruce and Mohammed Mohsin used times series tax return and 
survey data from the IRS and Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) from 1950 
to 1999 to examine the effect of personal income tax rates on the tendency 
of people to be entrepreneurs.53  The authors found that personal income tax 
rates have a very small positive effect on four measures of entrepreneurial 
activity:  the share of tax filers with income from a small business, 
profession, or farm; the share of filers with income from a small business, 
profession, farm, partnership, or S corporation; the self-employed share of 
the nonagricultural work force; and the self-employed share of the total 
workforce.54  The elasticities for these four measures ranged from 0.113 to 
0.156.55  However, they are only statistically significant in the BLS data. 
Similar results have been found in other countries.  Simon C. Parker and 
Martin T. Robson empirically explored how the average personal income 
tax rate and the payroll tax affected aggregate nonagricultural self-
employment rates in twelve Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) countries from 1972 to 1996 and found that self-
employment rates are positively related to average personal income tax 
rates.56 
Roberto Torrini examined twenty-five OECD countries, omitting former 
communist nations.57  Using information from 1997, 1998, and 1999, he 
found a positive and significant interaction between corruption and the tax 
wedge on self-employment.58  Higher taxes lead to higher self-employment 
rates if tax evasion is common in a country. 
However, Parker did not find evidence of the tax avoidance hypothesis.59  
He empirically explored the effects of tax avoidance opportunities on 
occupational choice between wage employment and self-employment using 
cross-sectional British microdata from 1994.  Using a detailed measure of 
the tax incentive for self-employment, Parker found that tax avoidance and 
evasion had no effect on occupational choice between wage employment 
and self-employment.60  Similarly, Mikael Stenkula found no effect of the 
top marginal income tax rate on unincorporated self-employment using 
Swedish time series data from 1950 to 1999.61 
The positive effect of individual income tax rates on the tendency to go 
into business for one’s self also appears not to be constant across income 
levels.  The incentive to become self-employed to avoid taxes and increase 
deductions is higher at higher income levels, because there are fixed costs 
in tax avoidance.  Using microdata from the United States and Canada from 
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1983 to 1994, Herb J. Schuetze found that increases in the average personal 
income tax rates have large and positive effects on the rate of male self-
employment.62  Moreover, this effect is magnified when using tax rates at 
higher points in the income distribution and for those individuals who have 
higher levels of education.  The estimated impact of a 30 percent increase in 
taxes is an increase in the rate of self-employment between 0.9 and 2 
percent in Canada and an increase between 0.8 and 1.4 percent in the 
United States.63  Similarly, Cullen and Gordon found that uniformly 
reducing the marginal personal income tax rate would decrease 
entrepreneurial activity by more for entrepreneurs in the highest earning 
quintiles.64 
The studies that provide evidence for the positive effects of marginal 
income tax rates on entry into entrepreneurship suffer from many of the 
same problems that the studies that provide evidence of the negative effects 
display—inconsistent effects across types of entrepreneurial activity, small 
effect sizes, and tests of self-employment and Schedule C tax filings that 
might not represent entrepreneurship as policymakers envision it.  Despite 
their methodological weaknesses, however, these articles highlight why 
policymakers should avoid drawing normative conclusions about the effect 
of income tax rates on entrepreneurial entry.  The limited evidence for the 
effect, combined with its theoretically ambiguous pattern, suggests that 
marginal income tax rates do not have a clear effect on entrepreneurial 
entry. 
D.  Evidence of Countervailing Effects on Entry 
Some studies explicitly address the issue of countervailing effects of 
marginal income tax rates on entry into entrepreneurship.  These studies 
argue that individual income tax rates simultaneously reduce the incentive 
to be in business, by reducing profits, and increase the incentive to be in 
business, by providing greater opportunity to avoid taxes.  Because these 
countervailing effects have different magnitudes at different levels of 
income, some economists expect to see a curvilinear relationship between 
marginal tax rates and the tendency to be self-employed. 
David M. Blau, for example, examined data from the BLS Current 
Population Survey from 1948 to 1982.65  He found that increases in 
marginal tax rates faced by lower income levels reduced the overall rate of 
self-employment, while increases in the marginal rates faced by those at 
upper income levels increased the overall rate of self-employment.66  Blau 
concluded that uniform changes in marginal tax rates have little effect on 
the fraction of self-employment due to the counteracting effects at high and 
low income levels. 
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However, not all studies that address effects by levels of income have 
shown the same curvilinear pattern.  For instance, Mina Baliamoune-Lutz 
and Pierre Garello find a strong negative relationship between both average 
and marginal tax rates and nascent entrepreneurship for a panel of fifteen 
European countries from 2000 to 2008.67  Their analysis suggests that tax 
progressivity tends to discourage entrepreneurship for those with high 
incomes, while encouraging entrepreneurship at low to average income 
levels.68 
William M. Gentry and R. Glenn Hubbard studied how the progressivity 
of the income tax schedule affects entrepreneurial entry among PSID 
households between 1979 and 1992.69  They found that more progressive 
tax schedules are associated with less entry on average.70 
Martin T. Robson and Colin Wren came to similar conclusions in a study 
of self-employment using aggregate data for fifteen OECD countries for the 
years 1978, 1981, 1985, 1989, and 1992.71  They studied how self-
employment responds to the average and marginal tax rates faced by typical 
production workers.  The two authors found that an increase in the marginal 
tax rate reduced self-employment, while increases in average tax rates made 
self-employment more attractive.72 
Yannis Georgellis and Howard J. Wall found that the effect of the top 
marginal tax rate on entry was either negative or positive as a function of 
whether the tax rate was high or low.73  They used state-level panel data of 
the working-age population (ages eighteen to sixty-four) from 1991 to 1998 
and found that the top marginal tax rate has a nonmonotonic, U-shaped 
relationship with the number of sole proprietors.74  When top marginal tax 
rates are low, between 28 and 35 percent, an increase in the rate reduces the 
number of sole proprietors.75  However, when the top marginal tax rate is 
greater than 35 percent, an increase in it boosts the number of sole 
proprietors.76 
The studies on the countervailing effects of marginal income tax rates on 
entrepreneurial entry employ a variety of measures, sources of variation 
(national or subnational), and examine different time periods and places, 
which likely accounts for some of the mixed results.  Nevertheless, even 
studies that examine entrepreneurial activity in the United States using the 
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share of returns with Schedule C income can come to opposite conclusions.  
Bruce and Mohsin find a small negative effect of tax rates on the Schedule 
C share of filers in a 1950 to 1999 time series,77 while Gordon and Cullen 
find a larger-sized positive effect in a 1964 to 1993 time series on a 
narrower measure (intended to better identify the risk taking associated with 
entrepreneurship) of Schedule C filers with losses.78 
A subset of papers on entry sets out to study countervailing effects 
explicitly by examining whether the entry effect differs by level of income 
or level of tax rate.79  Most of these analyses are conducted at the country 
level, which means that their inferences about differences in effects across 
groups are indirect at best.  Nevertheless, they do provide support for the 
proposition that the effects are countervailing, without agreeing on the 
groups for which the net effects are positive or negative. 
E.  Exit 
The typical outcome of an effort to start a business is a failed venture.  
The majority of newly formed businesses in the United States are shut 
down before their fifth year of operation.80  While business failure is often 
perceived as a negative outcome, in many cases it is better than the 
alternative of continued operation of a money-losing venture.  Society’s 
allocation of resources may be better if a failing business venture is shut 
down and its land, labor, and capital are put to other uses.  Furthermore, it is 
rarely clear ex ante whether a given business idea will result in a successful 
venture.  For every Facebook, there may be many Friendsters.  For these 
reasons, it is not clear a priori whether public policymakers should use tax 
policy to increase or decrease the failure rate of new and small businesses. 
Moreover, a high failure rate is one way in which entrepreneurship is a 
risky activity.  By reducing the failure rate on entrepreneurial activities, 
policymakers are blunting an important piece of information that people 
need to make informed decisions about pursuing new business 
opportunities.  If the risk of founding a company is higher, people will 
pursue only those ventures that they expect to generate sufficient return to 
justify the bearing of those risks.  By using policy tools to reduce the risk 
that people incur by engaging in entrepreneurial activity, policymakers are 
creating an incentive to engage in activities with relatively low returns.  It is 
far from clear that such an incentive would make for good allocation of 
resources. 
A few studies conducted in the United States have explored the 
relationship between tax rates and entrepreneurial exit.  As with entry, these 
studies do not offer any definitive conclusions when taken together.  Some 
research shows that self-employed entrepreneurs with higher expected 
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average tax rates are less likely than other entrepreneurs to exit self-
employment.81  Some research also shows that decreasing marginal tax 
rates on wage income decreases entrepreneurial duration, but decreasing 
marginal tax rates on business income increases entrepreneurial duration.82 
Robert Carroll et al. used data on Schedule C filers in 1985 and 1988 to 
study whether the change in rates due to the Tax Reform Act of 1986 
affected the survival probabilities of sole proprietorships.83  They found that 
rates did not affect survival probabilities.84 
By contrast, Tami Gurley-Calvez and Donald Bruce’s study of 1249 
individual and joint federal tax returns from 1979 to 1990 found that rates 
matter.85  Using duration analysis, these authors found that a 1 percentage 
point increase in marginal tax rates on individual wage income shortens the 
duration of entrepreneurial activity by 16.1 percent for single filers and 12.7 
percent for married filers.86  They also found that a 1 percentage point 
reduction of marginal individual tax rates on entrepreneurial income 
increases the duration of entrepreneurial activity by 32.5 percent for single 
filers and 44.8 percent for married filers.87 
The effect of individual income tax rates on exit from entrepreneurial 
activity shown in the Gurley-Calvez and Bruce study might stem from the 
incentive taxes create to shift economic activity between wage and self-
employment.  There is some evidence that taxes on wage and self-
employment income have differential effects on the probability of exit from 
entrepreneurial activity.  Bruce examined 2615 surveys of self-employed 
male household heads between ages twenty-five and fifty-four from the 
PSID survey during the years 1970 to 1991.88  He found that higher self-
employment tax rates decreased exit, while higher wage-and-salary tax rates 
increased it.89  A 1 percent increase in average self-employment tax rates 
decreases the probability of exit in his sample from 0.146 to 0.140, which 
corresponds to an elasticity of -4.25.90  Similarly, a 1 percent increase in the 
marginal self-employment tax rate decreases the probability of exiting from 
0.146 to 0.059, corresponding to an elasticity of -59.86.91  By contrast, a 1 
percent increase in the marginal wage-and-salary tax rate increases the 
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probability of exiting from 0.146 to 0.181.92  This corresponds to an 
elasticity of 23.77.93 
However, before policymakers conclude that taxes on wage and self-
employment income have differential effects on the probability of exit from 
entrepreneurial activity, they should consider the validity of this finding.  
Not only is this result shown in only a single study, but that study also has 
some methodological limitations that make it difficult to draw firm 
conclusions from it.  Most notably, the latter two elasticities mentioned 
above are implausibly large, raising questions about what other effects are 
being captured in the analysis.  As we mentioned earlier, policymakers 
should not base policy changes on studies whose effects might be spurious, 
or they risk producing outcomes inconsistent with the expected effect. 
Of three studies on the effect of marginal income tax rates on 
entrepreneurial exit, two examine Schedule C tax filers and disagree about 
the effect.94  Given the disagreement between the findings of Carroll et al. 
and Gurley-Calvez and Bruce, one might ask which result should be 
believed.  Because the 1986 reform was not driven by economic conditions, 
studies measuring its effects ought to be considered more reliable than those 
that measure reforms that themselves are influenced by economic 
conditions.  Therefore, policymakers would be better off believing that 
individual tax rate changes have no effect on the duration of entrepreneurial 
efforts than thinking that they have some effect. 
All three studies described in this section examine either self-
employment or Schedule C tax filings.  Both of these measures of 
entrepreneurship could be confounded with efforts to organize economic 
activity in the form of independent contracting rather than wage work.  As a 
result, even if the results were consistent across the studies, policymakers 
would be left with the question of whether the results represent the effect of 
marginal income tax rates on entrepreneurial exit, or merely the decision to 
reorganize economic activity from independent contracting to wage work. 
F.  Employment 
The popular press frequently discusses the value of new and small 
businesses to employment and the need for policymakers to support these 
entities.  In these discussions, one often sees the argument that 
policymakers should design tax policies to ensure that small and new 
businesses boost employment, or at least avoid designing tax policies that 
discourage new and small businesses from boosting employment. 
These discussions would lead a naïve observer to think that much 
research has examined the effect of tax policy on employment by small and 
new businesses.  However, we can find only one study that has looked into 
this question.  Carroll et al. examined 6078 self-employed individuals who 
filed Schedule C income on their personal income taxes in both 1985 and 
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1988, before and after the Tax Reform Act of 1986.95  They found that 
decreasing the marginal tax rate by 10 percent increases the probability of 
hiring labor by 12.1 percent, an elasticity of 1.2.96 
In addition, the authors found that a 10 percent decrease in marginal tax 
rates increased the total wage payments made to workers by 4.3 percent.97  
Furthermore, the authors showed that the greater the percentage decrease in 
the marginal tax rate, the higher the probability of hiring labor.98  Sole 
proprietors in the retail and service sectors also were more likely to hire.99  
Finally, the tax price effects did not vary with industry and did not affect 
high and low income sole proprietors differently.100 
However, because these authors examined self-employed individuals 
who filed Schedule Cs on their personal income tax returns, it is not clear 
what normative implications policymakers should draw from the 
researchers’ findings.  As we mentioned previously, only 20 percent of 
small businesses have employees, and an even smaller fraction account for 
the lion’s share of employment by small businesses.  This makes it difficult 
to extrapolate the mean tax effect that Carroll et al. present in their paper to 
overall employment by small business. 
In addition, it is difficult to draw firm conclusions about any policy 
decisions from a single empirical study.  We simply do not know if the 
Carroll et al. finding that lower tax rates increase small business 
employment is a general principle or specific to the time and place of their 
study or the particular sample examined. 
G.  Sales 
A similar pattern exists for the effect of tax policy on the performance of 
small businesses.  In more popular discussions, one often sees the argument 
that policymakers should design tax policy to ensure that small and new 
businesses boost revenue, or at least avoid designing tax policy that 
discourages new and small businesses from boosting sales. 
But, once again, we could find only one study that examined the effect of 
tax rates on small business owners’ sales.  In a study related to their work 
on exit and employment discussed above, Carroll et al. examined the effect 
of marginal personal income tax rates on the growth of sales of 6817 self-
employed individuals who filed Schedule C income on their personal 
income taxes in both 1985 and 1988 (before and after the Tax Reform Act 
of 1986).101  They found that increasing the tax price (decreasing the 
marginal tax rate) increases the growth of gross receipts at small businesses.  
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They determined the elasticity of receipts with respect to tax price is 
0.84.102 
Again, this study provides intriguing results, but it does not provide a 
blueprint for policymakers.  The study did not show that tax price affects 
sales of small businesses equally in all industries or for both high- and low-
income proprietors.  As with all studies involving Schedule C, it is also 
important to remember that the incentive to underreport income or 
overreport expenses falls at lower marginal tax rates, such as those 
implemented with the 1986 reform.  Further, Joel Slemrod reports that the 
1986 reform led to substantial shifting of income from the corporate tax 
base to the individual tax base.103  Therefore, this finding could be an 
artifact of the 1986 tax reform and not something that economists would 
observe in other tax policy changes. 
III.  IMPLICATIONS OF EVIDENCE ON TAX RATES 
FOR ENTREPRENEURSHIP POLICY 
The literature on individual income tax policy and entrepreneurship does 
not offer much guidance to policymakers.  The evidence for the effects of 
policies on outcomes is limited to correlations, because experimental 
evidence is not available.  As a result, all of the findings suffer from the 
potential for omitted variable bias, reverse causality, and unobserved 
heterogeneity. 
Moreover, the direction and magnitude of the correlation between 
taxation on entrepreneurial activity varies substantially depending on the 
way entrepreneurship is measured, making the findings quite inconsistent 
across measures.  Two key findings for policymakers seeking to be 
normative—whether the tax has a positive effect or a negative one and the 
magnitude of that positive or negative effect—simply are not found with 
enough consistency to make statements about the expected effects of 
increasing or decreasing individual income tax rates on different aspects of 
entrepreneurial activity. 
Some of the measures themselves have far less construct validity than 
others (e.g., Schedule C tax filings), because they may not represent true 
business creation, but rather efforts to shift existing economic activity into 
forms that are less heavily taxed.  If people respond to increased individual 
income tax rates by moving from wage employment to self-employment as 
a way to evade taxes, policymakers may not see this as a desirable outcome. 
For some dimensions of entrepreneurial activity, the number of articles 
examining the effect of tax policy is too small to have confidence in the 
findings, particularly when those few studies yield contradictory results.  
Moreover, the variation used to examine the effects in many studies may 
not be exogenous, and the level of analysis at which the effect is being 
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explored may not provide confidence that the hypothesized effect is being 
identified adequately. 
The results found for the effects of tax policy on different aspects of 
entrepreneurial activity are far from consistent.  Rather than the individual 
income tax affecting all types of entrepreneurial activity in the same 
manner, the results show that the individual income tax has theoretically 
inconsistent effects on different aspects of entrepreneurship. 
Taken as a whole, the literature does not provide sufficient evidence to 
explain the effect of individual income tax policy on entrepreneurs, let 
alone predict the effect of a novel tax policy on entrepreneurial activity.  
Policymakers should be aware that the economics literature offers them 
little guidance on this topic. 
Perhaps the most useful lesson provided by this literature comes from its 
difficulties with measurement.  The population of entrepreneurs whose 
activities create substantial employment and productivity growth is small.  
If policymakers wish to promote this activity, it is probably better to find 
ways of addressing this population directly through targeted policies, rather 
than through the blunt instrument of individual income tax rates that affect 
nearly everyone. 
